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INTRODUCTION
At approximately 10 o’clock on the morning of February 19, 1942, the

Imperial Japanese Navy and Army Air Force opened a coordinated attack
on Darwin, Australia. More than 188 aircraft launched from four aircraft carriers and fifty-five land-based bombers destroyed shipping and
the harbor’s transport and military infrastructure. Nearly an hour later, a

subsequent raid by Japanese army bombers attacked the Royal Australian
Air Force base at Parap, destroying numerous aircraft and base facilities.

From February 1942 through November 1943, the Japanese conducted

sixty-four more air attacks on Darwin. In addition, the Japanese carried
out similar strikes on Townsville, Katherine, Windham, Derby, Broome,

and Port Hedland. Even though Australia and New Zealand joined the
war in 1939, their respective air forces were ill prepared at the outbreak

of war with Japan because the majority of their military assets had been
sent to the Middle East in support of British operations.

The study of the development of the air defense of Great Britain’s

Pacific Dominions demonstrates the difficulty of applying the emerg-

ing military aviation technology to the defense of the global British
Empire during the interwar years. It also provides insight into the

changing nature of the political relationship between the Dominions
and Britain within the British imperial structure. At the end of World

War I, both Australia and New Zealand secured independent control
1
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of their respective armed forces through their sacrifices made on the

battlefields in the Middle East and Western Front and declining confidence in British military leadership. Similar to the other nations that

participated in the war, the population of these two Dominions in the
1920s developed a strong aversion to war, not wishing to repeat the

sacrifices made by their soldiers, sailors, and airmen on someone else’s
behalf. The economic dislocation experienced by the Dominions, cre-

ated by the war and the Depression, meant little money was available
to fund their respective air forces. 1 As a result, the empire’s air services
spent the entire interwar period attempting to create a comprehensive
strategy in the face of these handicaps.

For many aviation advocates during the interwar period, the airplane

represented a panacea to the imperial defense needs. They always prefaced

their arguments with the word “potential.” The airplane could potentially replace the navy; it could potentially provide substantial savings

in defense expenditure; it could potentially move rapidly to threatened

regions; and it could potentially defend the coast from attack or invasion.
For all of these claims, there was no supporting empirical data. In short,
aviation advocates offered the air force as a third option for the empire’s
defense, in an attempt to replace the Royal Navy and British Army.

At first glance, it is easy to accuse Britain and its Dominions of

willful neglect of their armed forces during the interwar years. As early
as 1934, however, Britain’s military and political leadership understood

the threat to peace and stability that Germany, Italy, and Japan repre-

sented, but the empire faced a difficult strategic problem in having a
military force structure inadequate to defend the vast worldwide impe-

rial possessions and the inability to pay for the needed expansion. The
General Staff, to the best of their ability, began to implement the necessary steps required to expand their military forces to meet these threats

and particularly directed funds to expand their respective air forces.
Although the leadership was much criticized in the postwar period,
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their diligence paid dividends as early as 1940, when Britain’s aircraft

industry outpaced German aircraft production, and by 1944, the air
forces of the British Empire experienced an expansion well beyond the
perceived needs contemplated by the military and political leadership

during the interwar period. Many of the policies adopted and implemented by the RAF, RAAF, and RNZAF during the interwar years
made this expansion possible.

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) experienced a fourfold

increase from seventeen operational squadrons in 1939 to seventy-one

in 1944. This included operational squadrons in Britain comprised of
four heavy bomber, three medium/attack bomber, seven fighter, and
one flying boat squadrons; in the Middle East there were two medium/
attack bomber and two fighter squadrons; and in the Pacific the RAAF

fielded a force of fifty-five squadrons that included fourteen fighter,
fifteen attack/medium bomber, eleven transport and liaison, eight sea-

plane, and seven heavy bomber squadrons. 2 In addition, more than

4,000 Australian pilots, air crew members, and mechanics served in
Royal Air Force (RAF) units throughout the war.

Likewise, the smaller Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF)

sustained a similar expansion from four prewar squadrons to thirty-

three squadrons by 1944. By the end of the war, New Zealand had
based eight squadrons overseas, including seven in Britain, consisting

of two fighter, three attack/medium bomber, one heavy bomber, and
one flying boat squadrons, as well as one fighter squadron stationed

in West Africa. Twenty-six RNZAF squadrons served in the Pacific

theater and included thirteen fighter, six attack/medium bomber, two
flying boat, two torpedo, two liaison/transport, and one dive-bomber

squadrons that complemented American Army Air Forces, marine,

and navy units throughout the entire Solomon Islands campaign. 3 In
addition, New Zealand provided more than 10,363 trained personnel
for service in the Royal Air Force. 4

4
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The raids on Darwin and the dramatic expansion of the Pacific

Dominions’ air forces reflect the strategic decisions made during the

interwar period concerning those nations’ aerial defense. With the

advantage of hindsight, the Japanese air attacks on Australia confirmed

the judgment of the British chiefs of the Imperial General Staff that
the greatest threat to the continent would be raids and that Japan’s air
power was incapable of a knockout blow. In addition, the chiefs’ views

were confirmed when the Japanese decided not to invade Australia in
early 1942.5

By the beginning of the World War II, there were essentially two

Australian and New Zealand air forces that emerged from the interwar period. One consisted of the units and personnel that served in

Britain as part of the Royal Air Force and that fulfilled the Dominions’
imperial commitments and prewar strategic assumptions. These units

were trained, equipped, patterned after, and served alongside other
RAF units. These Australian and New Zealand air force units repre-

sented the most significant contribution of men and materiel by the two
Dominions in Western Europe during the war. Following the North
African campaign, no Australian ground unit fought in Europe and
only one New Zealand division served in the Italian campaign.

Australia and New Zealand’s second air force were those RAAF

and RNZAF units serving in the Pacific. These units represented the
majority of the Dominions’ air power and the changing nature of their

relationship with Britain. Both nations developed and kept a high percentage of their units in the Pacific for self-defense rather than providing

them for the greater “imperial” need. Moreover, the makeup of these
units totally disregarded the prewar assumption of imperial uniformity. The RAAF units were an eclectic mix of British, Australian-built
British and American designs, and American aircraft. In the case of

New Zealand by the end of the war, all of its twenty-six squadrons

were equipped exclusively with American aircraft. The rapid expansion
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of both air forces would not have been possible without the aircraft
provided by the United States. The war underscored the Dominions’
transition from the British to the American sphere of influence.

During the interwar period the Royal Air Force had to fight to

maintain its independence. Likewise, the RAAF and RNZAF, because
of political, economic, and technological circumstances, were largely
“paper” air forces. In their effort to maintain their very existence, these

imperial air forces presented themselves as a viable and economical
third option in the defense of Britain’s global empire.

The inspiration of this work comes out of my interest in the Royal

Navy during the interwar period. The terrible loss of HMS Prince of Wales
and Repulse to waves of Japanese torpedo bombers on December 10,

1941, and the surrender of 84,000 British and Commonwealth troops
brought on many books about the failed “Fleet to Singapore” strategy conceived by Fleet Admiral John Jellicoe in 1919. The plan called

for the construction of a major naval facility located at Singapore to
service and house the bulk of the Royal Navy if a crisis developed in

the Pacific against the Japanese. Ian McGibbon’s Bluewater Rationale

and Ian Hamill’s The Strategic Illusion, major works, both illustrate the

importance of Singapore serving as a defensive hub to protect Britain’s
eastern empire, particularly Australia and New Zealand. The Royal

Air Force, equipped with inadequate aircraft that were few in number,
tended to receive less treatment by historians. This changed in recent

times with the publication of Christopher Shores and Brian Cull’s thor-

ough volume, Bloody Shambles: The Drift to War to the Fall of Singapore,
and Graham Clayton’s more focused study, Last Stand in Singapore: The
Story of 488 Squadron RNZAF. One aspect of historical research on

the RAF in the fall of Singapore points blame for the collapse at Air

Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief Far East.
Appointed to the position in October 1941, he was on the job for less

than four months before war broke out in the Pacific. Brooke-Popham’s
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role is only recently receiving a reevaluation in Peter Dye’s The Man Who

Took the Rap: Sir Robert Brooke-Popham and the Fall of Singapore. After
reading these studies and others, I began to wonder if the RAF was

making similar efforts concerning the defense of the Pacific empire. The

answer was yes in an almost forgotten survey by Group Captain Arthur
Bettington. Like Jellicoe, Bettington toured the Pacific Dominions in
the immediate post–World War I period and made recommendations

concerning the future of aerial defenses of the Dominions. So I became
more interested in the Royal Air Force during the interwar period and
wanted to trace its defense planning for the empire.

The vast majority of works on the RAF of the interwar period

tend to emphasize British strategic bombing doctrine as conceived
by Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard. They trace a direct path to the
massive formations of Halifax and Lancaster heavy bombers that

laid waste to German cities. Four of the earliest works are Hilary St.
George Saunders’s Per Ardua: The Rise of British Air Power, 1911–1939;
H. Montgomery Hyde’s British Air Policy between the Wars, 1919–1939;
Neville Jones’s The Beginnings of Strategic Air Power: A History of the

British Bomber Force, 1923–1939; and Barry Powers’s Strategy without
Slide-Rule: British Air Strategy, 1914–1939. In more recent times are

Malcom Smith’s British Air Strategy between the Wars, 1919–1939 and
Tami Davis Biddle’s Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution
of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945. All of

these histories focus on the role that the RAF would play in European

air space and do not address the position the RAF was attempting to
forge in imperial defense. If strategic bombing was a keystone to RAF

planning during the interwar period, why did Bomber Command have

such horrible aircraft at the beginning of World War II? The bomber
force would not see its first four-engine heavy bomber in the Short
Stirling until the summer of 1940 at the height of the Battle of Britain.

During the interwar period the RAF attempted to establish itself as a
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coequal in imperial defense beside the Royal Navy and British Army.

Yes, Trenchard wrote about the need for a strategic bombing force,
a duty in war unique to the RAF and a way to justify its continued
independence. Trenchard was also a political realist and looked for any
activity during the interwar period to keep the force autonomous from

the army and navy. This has brought a number of interesting studies that

examine the use of the RAF in the role of colonial control and policing.
The most noted of these works include David Omissi’s Airpower and

Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force 1919–1939 and Barry Renfrew’s
Wings of Empire: The Forgotten Wars of the Royal Air Force, 1919–1939.

To discover how air power developed in the Pacific, one must turn

to historians from Australia and New Zealand for the answer. The opening chapters of the two official histories of the RAAF and RNZAF in

World War II in Douglas Gillison’s Australia in the War of 1939–1945,
Series 3, Air, vol. I, Royal Australian Air Force, 1939–1942 and Sqd.

Ldr. J. M. S. Ross’s New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–1945:

The Royal New Zealand outline the activities of the origins, found-

ing, and interwar activities of their respective Dominion’s air forces.

C. D. Coulthard-Clark’s The Third Brother: The Royal Australian Air
Force 1921–1939 is an excellent and comprehensive study of the RAAF
between the wars. John McCarthy’s Australia and Imperial Defense:

A Study in Air and Sea Power, 1918–1939 and W. David McIntyre’s New
Zealand Prepares for War: Defence Policy, 1919–39 are both wide-ranging

examinations of the defense policies of Australia and New Zealand and
both demonstrate the importance of these forces in the defense of their
region of the Pacific.

Now that a full century has passed since the end of World War I,

this work, British Imperial Air Power: The Royal Air Forces and the Defense
of Australia and New Zealand Between the World Wars, hopes to provide a

fresh and comprehensive examination of the role that air power would
play in the Pacific.

8

BRITISH IMPERIAL AIR POWER

I alone am responsible for this manuscript but no work is the sole

product of its author. During the course of its research and writing,
I relied on numerous individuals for assistance and it could not be

completed without them. The author thanks those most responsible in

support of this work. The following chairs of the Aeronautics Division

at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum,

Tom Crouch, Dominick Pisano, Peter L. Jakab, F. Robert van der
Linden, Russell Lee, and Jeremy Kinney for providing the time, finan-

cial assistance, and opportunity to conduct research at various archives
throughout the world. To Nicholas Partridge who helped shepherd the
book’s contract to completion with Purdue University Press. Without

their support, this work would not have been possible. I would particu-

larly like to thank F. Robert van der Linden who read numerous drafts

and was always a sounding board for my thoughts as I developed the
chapters of my book. To Dr. Hines Hall at Auburn University whose
help and guidance was critical to my academic career.

The author also thanks the professional archival and library staffs

from those in the front line managing the reference desk to the indi-

viduals deep in the stacks pulling records at the National Air and Space
Museum, Smithsonian Institution; the National Archives, Kew; the
National Archives of Australia at Canberra and Melbourne; and the

Archives of New Zealand, Wellington; without them the historian’s
task is impossible. I wish that I could name all of you individually in rec-

ognition of the truly valuable work that you do. In addition, I would like
to thank the staff members from the following museums: the Australian
War Memorial, the Royal Air Force Museum, the Royal Australian and

Royal New Zealand Air Force Museums, the Yamato Museum, the
National Portrait Gallery, London, and the National Library of New
Zealand who provided all of the illustrations for this work.

In addition, Dr. Ron Wilkerson who was the first teacher to

encourage my interest in history and whose enthusiasm for history

INTRODUCTION

9

was inspiring; and the unselfish guidance of Dr. Brian Farrell of the

National University of Singapore who helped me unlock the files during
my very first research trip to the National Archives at Kew.

I would also like to thank my family, my sister Cynthia, and

my brother Todd for their support and encouragement that kept me
grounded during the course of my studies. My ultimate thanks go to

my father, Stephen, and mother, Hildegard, whose love, support, and
guidance sustain my every endeavor.

CHAPTER 1

THE FIRST IMPERIAL AIR DEFENSE
SCHEMES, 1918–1919
It will be appreciated that the complexity of the problem is increased

by the fact that in the case of the Royal Air Force there is no pre-war
experience to which reference can be made. 1

— Lord William Douglas Weir

At the end of World War I, Britain’s leaders had to reconsider the

traditional pillars of imperial foreign policy: a balance of power on the

European continent, free and clear trade routes to imperial possessions
and the Dominions, and superiority of the Royal Navy on the seas.

Germany’s defeat, along with the revolution in Russia, created a power
vacuum in Europe. Decimated by four years of war, the European powers could not fill this void, though some tried. The rising influence of

the United States and imperial Japan tipped the balance of power away
from Britain in the Pacific, although Britain may well have lost its

influence before the war in its efforts to counter the growing threat of
the Imperial German Fleet in European waters.
11
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To add to the British circumstances, Britain’s global territorial

responsibilities actually expanded in the war’s aftermath. By the end

of 1918, a military expedition to assist the White Russians against the
Bolsheviks, control of new Middle Eastern mandates, and the suppression of nationalist movements throughout the empire placed additional

military burdens on Britain. Labor unrest, mutinies, and the Irish
uprising further complicated Britain’s postwar military circumstances

at home. Winston Churchill summed up the situation when he stated,

“I cannot too strongly press on the Government the danger, the extreme
danger, of His Majesty’s Army being spread all over the world, strong
nowhere and weak everywhere.” 2 The huge national debt, created by the

war, limited many military options that had been available in the past.
Chief of the Air Staff Sir Hugh Trenchard echoed Churchill’s warnings
from the air force’s perspective:

The necessity for economy remains unchanged, but the peaceful

conditions hoped for have been far from realized. So great a
portion of the world has been pervaded by the spirit of unrest,

and so largely have the commitments of the Empire been
increased by the results of the war . . . 3

The Dominions further compounded Britain’s foreign and military policy
difficulties. During the war, the Dominions’ prime ministers demanded

and were promised inclusion in policy decisions that potentially affected
their respective states. At the same time, Australia and New Zealand

pursued courses of action that ran counter to traditional British interests,

such as claiming mandate responsibility over regional Pacific islands that
were of no interest in London. This placed the British Empire in direct

competition with Japan. While the Dominions demanded greater inde-

pendence with regard to their emerging foreign policies, they insisted
that Great Britain remain committed to their defense.
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With Germany defeated and Russia enmeshed in civil war, British

leaders found a new threat to the empire: Britain’s Pacific ally, Japan.

The Anglo-Japanese Naval Alliance, signed in January 1902, allowed
the Royal Navy to remain concentrated in European waters to counter
the growth of the Imperial German Navy. In addition, the agreement

helped to defend against any threat to British and Japanese interests in
the Pacific from Russian expansion. During the war, the agreement

proved its value when Japanese warships provided escorts to the troop-

ships filled with Australians and New Zealanders on their way to the
Middle Eastern and Western fronts and even suffered some losses in

the Mediterranean. However, in the postwar environment, could the
agreement remain intact? Many thought not.

In assessing the postwar world, Trenchard remarked about the

Japanese:

It is not improbable after the storm in Europe, the centre of
pressure of unrest will move eastwards and that the future will

find it located in China and Japan. There would appear, there-

fore, to be grounds for an increase of our naval strength in the
Pacific and pari passu for the building up of a suitable air force.

These considerations have already been weighted in

Australia and New Zealand, and both dominions have intimated their desire for air services. 4

Australian prime minister William “Billy” Hughes did not help Britain’s
relationship with Japan. While making his way to Europe in June 1918,

he made a speech in New York City in which he proposed a new vision
for the future of Pacific security:

In order to ensure the existence of Australia as a common-

wealth of federal states of free people, the Australians must be

14
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provided with a strong guarantee against invasion, and such a

guarantee might be found in an Australian Monroe doctrine
in the South Pacific.

To ensure the safety of Australian territory, it is important

that control over the islands on the eastern and northern coasts
of Australia should either be taken over by Australia herself,

or entrusted to some brave and civilized State. It is the United
States to which the Australians look for assistance in the matter.5

Hughes’s comments were as unpopular in Britain as they were in Japan.
For the first time Australians looked to a power other than Britain for
their security. Hughes imagined an American Pacific Monroe Doctrine
backed up by American naval and military power or at the very least

the creation of a “hands off the Australian Pacific” policy. This position

staked out by Hughes in New York continued to be his steadfast posture
at the Versailles Peace Conference. During the war, Australia and Japan

expanded their spheres of influence in the Pacific. The Australians,
who felt threatened by the German presence in New Guinea, took

control of the island early in the war. In addition, a joint Australian and
New Zealand force captured Samoa. Meanwhile, the Japanese, taking
advantage of the German weakness, moved south and occupied the
Marshall and Caroline island groups.

These actions disrupted the peace discussions at Versailles in January

1919. When Prime Minister Hughes arrived in Paris, he fully intended
to maintain Australian sovereignty over New Guinea. He believed that

all of the northern islands were essential for Australian security. Hughes’s
claims to the islands and “Pacific Monroe Doctrine” directly clashed with

President Wilson’s “just peace” based on his Fourteen Points and position that no nation should benefit from victory. Concerning Australian
claims in the Pacific, Hughes’s reaction was recorded in the minutes of

the Imperial War Cabinet meeting that took place on December 30,
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1918. Hughes opposed Wilson’s position of independence for the for-

mer German colonies and argued that Wilson did not understand how
essential these islands were for Australia’s own security. 6

In January 1919, the meetings at Versailles addressed the topic

of Germany’s Pacific colonies. At a meeting of the Council of Ten,
Hughes stated his uncompromising position:

Strategically the Pacific Islands encompass Australia like a

fortress . . . this is a string of islands suitable for coaling and
submarine bases, from which Australia could be attacked. If

there were at the very door of Australia a potential or actual

enemy, Australia could not feel safe. The islands are as necessary to Australia as water to a city. If they were in the hands of
a superior, there would be no peace for Australia. 7

Hughes’s concerns did not impress President Wilson who believed that
the old notions of national security would not be applicable in the post-

war world and that Hughes’s position was “based on a fundamental lack
of faith in the League of Nations.” 8 On this point, Hughes agreed with

President Wilson, for Hughes placed little faith in the league’s ability to
control “bad neighbors.” 9 Because of Wilson’s position, Hughes likely

viewed the U.S. support in Pacific security as unreliable and returned

to the position that Australian security was still best served within the
British imperial system.

The stance taken by Hughes at Versailles placed British prime

minister David Lloyd George in a difficult position between attempt-

ing to sustain imperial unity by supporting Australian territorial
claims and at the same time maintaining a constructive relationship

with Wilson. South African prime minister Ian Smuts proposed a
compromise. Smuts designed the mandate system, which placed the
former German colonies into three categories based on their social and

16
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economic development and geographical location. The Smuts compromise became Article 22 of the League of Nations Compact. Under a

Class “C” mandate classification, the administration of New Guinea
became Australia’s responsibility:

Owing to the sparseness of their population, their small size, or

their remoteness from centers of civilisation, or their geograph-

ical continuity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other
circumstances, can best be administered under the laws of the
Mandatory as an integral portion of its territory. 10

The only power remaining in the Pacific that threatened peace, from

the Dominions’ perspective, was Japan. Whereas Australia and New
Zealand considered their own actions as defensive, they viewed Japanese

annexation of the Marshall and Caroline Islands as aggressive expansionism. New Zealand’s defense minister, Sir James Allen, believed

that the British Empire would “regret” letting the Japanese remain in
control of the two island groups. 11

In a cable, Monroe Furguson, governor general of Australia, also

expressed concerns that Japanese expansionism was a threat to the
newly formed League of Nations and the agreements made at Versailles.

In Furguson’s opinion, the Japanese expansion into the central Pacific
was challenging decisions made at Versailles because “she is a powerful

nation having at her disposal great military resources [and] cannot be
allowed to flout the solemn decision of the Conference.” 12

With the emerging diplomatic tension between the British and

Japanese empires exacerbated by Australia’s political leadership, Britain’s

military began to evaluate how to defend the Pacific. Early in 1919,
former First Sea Lord Admiral John Jellicoe left on an imperial cruise
with instructions to determine the naval defense of the empire. At the
same time, the leadership of the Royal Air Force began to examine
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their service’s future role in peacetime defense of the empire. The pro-

cess of the transition to peacetime operations would be more difficult
for the Royal Air Force compared to the army or navy. Created during

the war by combining the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air

Service, the RAF had no peacetime tradition such as providing security
in some remote outpost of the empire or showing the flag during a diplomatic cruise. The new service faced a hostile army and navy wanting

to break apart the RAF and reclaim their respective air branches that
were taken from them during the war. The air force’s leadership looked
to the emerging antagonism with the Japanese as a basis to formulate
its future responsibilities in defense of the empire.

The president of the Air Council, Lord Weir, asserted in December

1918 that the Royal Air Force would take an important part in imperial
defense. Weir argued that aviation had proved its value during the war

but its future potential was unclear because the current state of aircraft
development was still in its “infancy.” For Weir, air power in time would

become an equal partner in imperial defense alongside the army and the

navy, and “it will be necessary to provide an Air Force of such strength
as will amply meet the needs of the Empire.” 13

Less than a month following the signing of the Armistice on

November 11, 1918, Trenchard, newly appointed chief of the Air Staff,

issued a memorandum outlining the RAF’s vision of postwar defense:
The Imperial aspects of the question [of air defense] cannot be

overrated and must be considered equally with those pertain-

ing to purely national requirements; the foundations of the air
power of the British Empire must be well and truly laid. 14

From the scale and scope of the memorandum, it appears that the

Air Staff was clearly working on the imperial air defense issues well
before the war’s end. Trenchard’s memorandum delineated how the
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RAF would participate in and potentially come to dominate the defense
responsibilities for the empire. The Air Staff examined how to utilize

the air force in small and large conflicts while maintaining its indepen-

dence from the navy and army. It outlined specific force structures and
dispositions throughout the empire and argued that the Dominions’

air services would need to play a direct and vital role in the future air
defense of the empire.

The flying distances were truly daunting, especially for the limited

capabilities of the aircraft of the day. Trenchard recognized that the

state of aviation technology limited the effectiveness of air power and

force projection, “owing to the comparatively short radius of action of

contemporary aircraft.”15 The Air Ministry plotted a route from London

to Australia that required 59 stops  —  one every 200 miles  —  and cov-

ered the 11,500 miles to Darwin. Nevertheless, this did not deter
Trenchard’s belief in the future potential of air power: “we possess a
rapid and economical instrument by which to ensure peace and good
government in our outer Empire.” 16

A vital element of the overall air defense of the empire from the

perspective of the Royal Air Force was the participation of each of the
Dominions in any scheme that would emerge in the postwar period.

Trenchard wrote that both Pacific Dominions were interested in establishing air forces as a part of their own security against a threat from Japan.17
The Air Ministry also felt that the Dominions’ air forces would

need to have aircraft and training similar to the RAF. This would allow
the two forces, even though separated by vast geographic distances,
easily to mesh at any crisis spot.

Lord Weir in a memorandum to the War Cabinet emphasized the

point that imperial defense would become ever more dependent upon
Dominion participation, and he felt that in the future the airplane

would be a critical element in that defense. Trenchard also believed that
the RAF could not move forward in any imperial air defense scheme
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until the Dominions made some decision about the size and form of
their own air forces. 18 Trenchard’s position regarding Dominion par-

ticipation was different from the commanders of the Royal Navy. He

looked upon the Dominions as full partners in aerial defense rather
than providing adjunct forces:

The Dominions should be approached with a view to assistance
in reconstituting the air staff into an Imperial Air Staff on the
lines of the Imperial General Staff.

While it is not desired in any way to accentuate Eastern

political complexities, the pressure of unrest in this sphere must

be faced. In the past the fears of Australia resulted in the formation of the nucleus of the Australian Navy, and Australia has

already inaugurated her own Air Service which her distance
from the Mother Country renders all important. 19

Trenchard envisioned an Imperial Air Force with all the imperial mem-

bers acting in unison. Such an agreement with the Dominions could
extend the empire’s air defense capabilities while limiting the financial
burden for Britain and the Royal Air Force. Trenchard argued that:
Too much stress cannot be laid on the importance of unity and

the necessity for organising these aerial resources on similar
lines . . . both sides must make every effort to strengthen until
a state of perfect and efficient cooperation exists between the
various components of the British Empire.

The first essential is that methods of training and organ-

isation and types of machines and equipment should be
standardised. Each Dominion would require a Central School
at which flying, navigation, aerial gunnery and bomb dropping, cooperation with land and sea forces, meteorology and
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photography would be taught on similar lines. As types of
machines improve replacements should be made on a propor-

tionate scale, and interchange of personnel should take place
so that training and operation methods, improvements due to

innovation, etc., may be co-ordinated throughout the whole of
the Imperial Air Force. Thus, if necessity arises, reinforcements

can be transferred from one quarter of the globe to another, and

on arrival at their destination will fit automatically into their
appointed places and carry out their appointed duties. 20

The need for imperial unity was a consistent theme from the leaders

within the Air Ministry. Once again, Frederick Sykes, assistant air
minister, emphasized this point in a speech before a luncheon of the
London Chamber of Commerce. Sykes believed that “air forces have

become and will remain a leading consideration in questions of national

and Imperial defence. The day is indeed not far distant when aircraft
will rank equally . . . with other and older forms of war material.” 21

The Air Ministry wasted no time contacting the Australians

about the extent of their participation in an Imperial Air Force. On

January 14, 1919, Major Clive L. Baillieu, the Air Ministry’s Australian

liaison officer, wrote to Australian Imperial Force Headquarters and
requested that Australia provide information or plans regarding the

air force strength relating to naval and army needs, personnel numbers

and training methods, equipment needs, standardization of training
and equipment, and commercial aviation plans in order to provide a
reserve of pilots and mechanics. 22

The concept of imperial aviation unity was not new. The ori-

gins of Australian military aviation dated back to 1915 when the

Commonwealth government formed the Australian Flying Corps to

cooperate with imperial troops operating in the Middle East. By the end

of the war, they had a force of more than 280 pilots and 3,000 support
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personnel. In the postwar world, the Australian government saw the
value of an aerial striking force and continued funding of an air force.

Australian leaders did not question the need to participate in the

empire’s defense, but they did question the scale and scope of their
participation and continually reassessed the degree of support they
could provide. There was going to be an Australian Air Service as a

component of imperial defense. The debates surrounding the role and
formation of an Australian Air Force were similar to those of the Royal
Air Force’s role taking place in Britain.

Because the strategic need to attack an enemy’s industrial and

communication capacity by air did not exist in the South Pacific, the

Australian air power advocates were in a much weaker position relative
to the Australian Army and Royal Australian Navy. The air service

would be required to act in a subordinate role to the other services.
Their aircraft would operate tactically, providing air cover for ground

or naval forces on the defensive and striking enemy shipping or ground
troops on the offensive.

Before the British asked the question regarding Australian involve-

ment in air defense, the Australians were considering their capability
and the strength of their air arm. In a meeting of the Australian

Council of Defence in early November 1918, the central discussion
on the agenda was the future form of an Australian Air Service. The

chief of the Australian General Staff, Major General John G. Legge,
“thought that there would be less extravagance if Australia had a[n] [air]

branch under the control of the Navy and Military.” 23 In the imme-

diate postwar period, the question of controlling Australia’s air forces
remained the central debate in the Council of Defence:

The provision of a nucleus of an Air Force [needed] to meet
certain fundamental needs of the Navy and the Army. This can
be done for an annual expenditure of £1,100,000.
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The Air Force recommended is auxiliary to the Navy and

the Army and is not an independent Force. It provides merely

for the minimum needs of existing defence services. Bearing

in mind the economic condition of the country and the fact
that time is pressing, the Council considers that the provision
of these minimum needs should be undertaken first but, consistent with this provision, the development of aviation should

proceed — for instance by the encouragement of commercial
aviation.

In the opinion of the Council, this minimum expendi-

ture will give Australia a “sporting chance” of holding out
till British command of the Pacific can be established. With

any less expenditure there would be no chance to security to
Australia in the event of War [with Japan]. 24

During these formative months following the war, the members of the

Council of Defence agreed that it was important that Australia have

significant air forces but they would not accept the creation of a separate
air force for the Commonwealth. For Australia’s military leadership

the principal defense of the Dominion was still dependent upon the
army and the navy. Because there was no strategic justification for a
separate air force, aircraft would have an important role to play but

would remain subordinate or auxiliary to the ground and sea forces. In
addition, Australia’s leadership was not confident that air power alone
could “assure” the national defense. 25

Australia’s navy and army leaders decided to split the Dominion’s

air assets between the two services and share training facilities. They
felt that the army would ultimately require seven fighter squadrons,

six reconnaissance squadrons, and two heavy bomber squadrons. The

navy would need one torpedo squadron, one shipborne aircraft squadron, and eleven flying boat squadrons. 26 These twenty-eight squadrons,
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they predicted, would be the minimum requirement to give Australia a

“sporting chance.” Ultimately, these squadrons were viewed only as air
auxiliaries to the naval and military forces.

In the postwar economic environment, the proposed annual expen-

diture of £1,100,000 was an extravagant if not absurd amount for the
Australians. Economic realities would soon force them to halve this
amount of money for an air force. It was reported in April 1919 that
A scheme of aerial defence, which has been drafted by the

Commonwealth Government, contemplates the establishment
of various aviation schools with squadrons of Aeroplanes and
seaplanes, together with an airship section, the personnel of the
scheme numbering 1,400. There will be an initial expenditure

of £500,000, and an annual expenditure of the same amount. 27
Undeterred by the reduction of the military funding, the Council of
Defence created a uniquely Australian solution to the problem. They

envisioned the creation of a dual force consisting of a permanent air
force and an aviation militia or the “Citizen Air Force.”

It is proposed to establish both permanent and Citizen Force
Units. Permanent units will be required for Naval centres, for

isolated squadrons, and for training squadrons. It is proposed

that 2 Reconnoitering Squadrons, 1 Flying-boat Squadron, to

be formed next year will be on the Citizen Force basis. The
difficulty of a Citizen Force, in the future, will be the time
required for continuous training for a pilot which takes about
one year.

Air Units will be organised as part of an Australian Air

Corps. This Corps will be formed in two wings, one for the
Navy and one for the Army. The Corps will be controlled
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separately from the Navy or Army by the Minister of Defence.
An Air Council composed of sailors and soldiers detailed from
the Naval and Military Boards will advise upon principle; the
administrative control of the Air Corps will be in the hands of
an Air Board, subordinate to the Air Council, and composed
of flying officers. 28

The value of the Citizen Air Force would be continually examined

throughout the interwar period. The formation of the Volunteer Reserve
in Britain originated from this Australian idea.

Britain’s military leadership did not forget New Zealand. They rec-

ognized that this Dominion’s fate was closely linked to that of Australia.
In 1919, Trenchard stated:

The possibility of unrest in the East affects New Zealand

equally with Australia. The length of her coast line makes

her peculiarly vulnerable to attack and her distance from the

Mother Country makes it necessary for her to be able to hold
her own until the arrival of available reinforcements. 29

Early in 1919, New Zealand’s defense minister, Sir James Allen,

requested that the Royal Air Force send an adviser to New Zealand
to provide recommendations for the Dominion’s postwar air defense
and aviation policy. The RAF sent Group Captain Arthur Vere

Bettington to assess New Zealand’s state of affairs. Bettington issued
a lengthy report to Allen in July that echoed many of the positions in

Trenchard’s memoranda on “Air Power Requirements of Empire.” But
like many of these early postwar planning documents, Bettington’s

recommendations were not realistic and went far beyond the scale and

scope that New Zealand’s political leaders or budgets were prepared
to handle.
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Figure 1.1. Lt. Col. Arthur Bettington (right) with New Zealand aviation
pioneer Sir Henry Wigram (left) at the Sockburn Aerodrome, New Zealand in
1919. Following World War I, Bettington toured Australia and New Zealand
to determine the two Dominions’ aerial defense requirements. His subsequent
report and recommendations laid the foundation of imperial interwar aerial
defense strategy. (Photograph courtesy of Air Force Museum of New Zealand)

With the war over in Europe, Bettington argued that international

instability would continue because of the vacuum left in Europe by the
defeat of the Central Powers. Bettington reiterated Trenchard’s position
that Japan might threaten peace in the Pacific:

It is impossible to reconcile the aspirations of all the nations.
Signs of this are already visible with certain Eastern nations

who have openly claimed equal rights. The Japanese may be
persistent in its demands for equality . . . for this reason, also
as a result of the elimination in the near future of the Central
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European Empires as warlike groups, the centre of unrest in
the world may now be assumed to have moved from Western
Europe to the Pacific. 30

Bettington warned that the potential antagonism between the British

Empire and Japan would place New Zealand in the middle of any

conflict between the two imperial powers. No longer could they enjoy
the protection afforded by vast distance from the traditional sources of
conflict in Europe:

While it is not desired to appear unduly pessimistic or to pose
as a scaremonger, the Eastern political complexities and unrest

should be squarely faced. The geographical position of this

Dominion renders an efficient defence force a greater necessity
than in the past. . . . The distance from the Mother Country

is so great that considerable time must elapse before assistance

could be expected from that quarter. The nearest point from
which help might arrive is over 1200 miles away and even then

it is by no means unlikely that Australia might find herself

threatened at the same time and not in a position to give aid. 31
Bettington repeated the common theme among the air power advo-

cates that an air force would be an important third option for imperial
defense alongside the Royal Navy and British Army. Bettington summarized this point:

Highly trained Air Forces are now essential components of all
efficient defensive and fighting forces, as aviation provides a new

and distinct striking force of temendous [sic] potentiality. . . .
A Nation thinking in three dimensions will lead and defeat a
nation thinking in two, both in time of peace and war. 32
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Bettington underscored Trenchard’s proposal that New Zealand

should participate in the Imperial Air Force. In addition, there was

an important connection between civil and military aviation if New
Zealand were to participate in imperial affairs. Bettington also stressed

that New Zealand’s air force should be prepared to render assistance to
any part of the empire.

So that New Zealand’s aerial policy became a reality, Bettington

strongly recommended that the Dominion should take immediate steps

to build an air force compatible with that of the British and Australian

air forces by standardizing their training, equipment, and procedures. 33
New Zealand’s meager industrial capacity made the Dominion

dependent upon Britain for its aviation equipment and infrastructure.
New Zealand would need to purchase all of this material from Britain to

maintain compatibility with its imperial partners, Bettington reported:
It may be assumed that for some years to come at least, New

Zealand will not be in a position to manufacture anything

more than the actual aeroplane or seaplane and will have to rely
on imported engines, guns, bombs, wireless sets, navigational

and other aircraft instruments, etc. As the close co-ordination
of aircraft equipment of the British Empire is of such vital

importance, it is proposed that in the first instance the com-

plete machines and engines with all their component parts and
armament be purchased in England, in consultation with the
Air Ministry, due regard being given to the standardisation,

as far as practicable, with the policy of Australia and the rest
of the Empire. 34

In retrospect, Bettington’s proposal for New Zealand’s aerial force struc-

ture seems modest — seeking seven squadrons that included one fighter,

one day and night bombing, one scout, one torpedo, and two flying boat
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squadrons, two air bases, and one training depot. 35 Bettington argued

that this force structure was the minimum required to defend the strategic points on New Zealand’s North and South Islands. 36*

Reasonable as the proposals seemed, New Zealand’s leaders were not

prepared to adopt Bettington’s scheme. Following a review of the plan by

New Zealand’s cabinet, Minister of Defence Allen informed him that

it was “impracticable” for the Dominion to spend the funds called for
to implement the civil and military aviation scheme that he outlined.37

In response to Allen’s admission that New Zealand could not afford

extensive aerial expenditures, Bettington sent him a number of sugges-

tions that further limited these defense burdens. He proposed to Allen
a reduction in his recommendation by three or four squadrons, hoping
that this proposition might address the fiscal concerns of the cabinet.
Once again, he received a negative reply.

By the end of August 1919, Bettington counseled New Zealand’s

cabinet that the Dominion still needed to participate in the imperial
partnership. He asked that the cabinet consider appointing an air liai-

son officer to track developments in commercial and military aviation
and establish or subsidize an aviation school on the North Island near

Auckland and on the South Island near Christchurch. Finally, he recommended that veteran New Zealanders with aviation training should be
kept on a reserve list and trained annually on the latest developments. 38
Beddington considered the following as the “chief nerve” centers and the most
likely to be attacked:
a. Wellington and the Cook Strait
b. Auckland
c. Christchurch and Lyttelton
d. The northernmost part of New Zealand including Awanui
e. Invercargill and Awarua
f. The coal fields of Westport and Graymouth
g. Dunedin and Port Chalmers
To defend these strategic points, he proposed New Zealand establish first-class
air bases at Wellington, Auckland, Christchurch, and Dunedin.
*
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For Bettington, these three steps were the minimum actions that New
Zealand could take to maintain a credible aerial presence.

To this end, New Zealand’s government agreed. To create a reserve of

aviators and aviation mechanics, the government devised a scheme to provide financial subsidies to the Sockburn and Kohimarama flying schools.

During the war, both schools had provided preliminary training for New
Zealanders who later served in the Royal Air Force. It became these two

schools’ responsibility to train an active reserve of 200 pilots, to pro-

vide periodic flight training and lectures, and to train a cadre of aircraft
mechanics. In the end, New Zealand’s government was only prepared to
spend £25,000 annually on any form of aviation, civil or military.39

Early in 1919, while the Australians and New Zealanders consid-

ered their own air defense plans, aerial strategists in London devised an

idea that they hoped would address the fiscal concerns of the Dominions
relating to the creation of their aerial defense and striking force and

ensure that they would begin working toward the unified Imperial Air
Force: British leaders initiated the transfer or gift of 100 surplus aircraft
to each Dominion. The origin of the aircraft gift was Trenchard’s idea.

Under-Secretary of State for Air Gen. John Edward Bernard Seely took
the idea to the Imperial War Cabinet. For Seely, a gift of aircraft to the

Dominions provided “an opportunity of giving assistance to Dominions
which will be valued by them and which should be of great use in the
general interest of the defence of the Empire by Air.” 40

On May 29, 1919, the War Cabinet approved Seely’s proposal and

decided to offer each Dominion government 100 surplus aircraft out of
the thousands of serviceable aircraft left over at the end of the war. The
War Cabinet decided that this gift would be available to any Dominion
or colonial government that required aircraft and that as much publicity
as possible should be generated on behalf of the government. 41

On June 4, 1919, cables went out to the Dominions and Colonies

informing their respective cabinets that the Air Ministry was proposing
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to send each of them aircraft to become the core of their respective air

forces. The gift of aircraft to the Dominions was well timed. Without
monetary resources or established aircraft facilities and with limited

military equipment at home, the transfer of aircraft would allow the
Dominions to form the nucleus of their own air arms.

The Australians were most eager to obtain the aircraft offered

by Britain. On June 21, 1919, Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Blamey submitted the initial request for four squadrons to “form the nucleus of
the Australian Air Force.” 42 The British Air Staff recommended that

this Australian force should consist of twenty-four Sopwith Snipes,
twenty-four Bristol Fighters, eighteen de Havilland D.H. 9s, and ten

Vickers Vimy bombers, one of the larger aircraft in the Royal Air
Force’s inventory. For the Australians, the gift amounted to more than

£624,000. 43 In addition, the British Air Staff made additional sugges-

tions regarding the importance of the Australians operating similar
equipment as the British.

On July 9, 1919, in a letter from Lt. Col. H. Macquire, the RAF’s

liaison officer to the Australian government, to Australian defense

minister Sir George Pearce, Macquire made additional suggestions
regarding equipment to be sent to Australia:

With reference to the proposed gift of 100 Aeroplanes by
H.M. Government and the equipment of 4 Squadrons of the
Australian Air Force, I forward the following proposals.

That the following types and numbers of machines should

be asked for:

35 AVROS. Training

30 S.E. 5 Viper engines in lieu of Snipes asked for.

35 D.H.9a, in lieu of Squadron D.H.9a with Rolls engines

asked for. 44
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Figure 1.2. Royal Aircraft Factory S.E.5a #A2-1 at Yanakie, Victoria. This
aircraft was one of 35 S.E.5as given to the RAAF by the British government
as part of the 1920 Imperial Gift. The RAAF’s leadership requested the S.E.5a
over the Sopwith Snipe because the aircraft was more stable and easier to fly.
(Photograph courtesy of the Australian War Memorial)

The Avro 504 would become the principal training aircraft for the
infant Australian Air Service. The replacement of the Sopwith Snipe

with the S.E.5a indicates Macquire’s preference for a safer and more
stable aircraft.

For Australia, the 100-airplane gift was only the beginning of its air

force. Prime Minister Hughes envisioned the creation of an Australian
aircraft-manufacturing sector whereby the 100 aircraft nucleus would
be supplemented over time by more than 200 aircraft built exclusively

in the Dominion. On July 4, 1919, Hughes wrote Prime Minister Lloyd
George:

In reference to your request that I should outline my views as
to the manufacture of AEROPLANES in Australia and its
relation to the Air Defence of Australia: My view is that the

best policy would be for the Commonwealth Government to
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arrange for some British firm of repute to commence man-

ufacture in Australia. To this end, I would recommend that
arrangements should be with such a firm, and that we should
stipulate for the right to take over the works on equitable terms

at any time, and also to have the right of control of such works
during war. 45

In an August 4, 1919, cable to Defence Minister Pearce, Hughes
approved Australia’s acceptance of the aircraft gift from Britain

along with his desire that construction of aircraft should take place in

Australia. 46 However, few things are truly free; Australia had to cover

the £25,000 to £30,000 freight expense to transport the aircraft to the
Commonwealth. 47

The plan to supplement the aircraft gift with Australian-built

aircraft illustrated Australia’s paramount desire to assert its indepen-

dence. The Committee of Defence established an Aircraft Construction
Committee to guide the creation of an Australian aircraft industry. In

its first report, the newly formed body recognized the importance and
limitations for Australia in the sphere of manufacturing. The Australian
government decided that they should produce dual-purpose aircraft

such as the de Havilland D.H.4, capable of both bombing and aerial

fighting. It was also important that the materials used to construct these
aircraft should be from local sources. Though the committee making
these recommendations agreed on the use of British equipment, a small

fissure emerged. The Australian Air Board, established in 1920 to con-

trol and administer the air force according to the policies established

by the Air Council, advised for the “adoption of American ‘Liberty’
engines in preference to a British type considering simplicity of manufacture.” 48 This was the first time, but not the last, Australians went

outside the imperial system for aircraft equipment. In 1938, a more

serious rift would take place over the adoption of American equipment.
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The gift of 100 aircraft from the British government was not received

in New Zealand with the same enthusiasm as it was in Australia. When
the British submitted their offer to New Zealand, Colonel Bettington
was writing his plan to develop military aviation in New Zealand. In

a June 5, 1919, letter to Sir James Allen, Bettington urged that the

Dominion accept the British government’s offer, “as keen competition
for the available supplies was likely.” 49

On August 27, 1919, Defence Minister Allen informed Bettington

that New Zealand did not have the means to service a hundred machines
and that the offer would have to be declined. 50 Allen’s rejection of the

British offer was greeted with surprise and disbelief in Britain. Stanley
Spooner, founder and editor of Flight, commented:

Sir J. Allen, the New Zealand Minister of Defence, says that

the British offer of Aeroplanes is “undoubtedly valuable,” rep-

resenting about £500,000, but its acceptance depends upon
the policy of New Zealand, which is not yet determined. The

Wellington Post, commenting upon this statement, says that the

offer of Aeroplanes should remind New Zealand equally of
British generosity and of her own responsibilities. Admitted,
in partnership with the Empire, to the League of Nations, the
Dominions should rise to the full status of manhood and accept

the gifts as a trust for the purposes for which they are offered
and undertake the fundamental obligation of self-defence.

What does the Minister of Defence mean exactly when he

says that the policy of New Zealand has not been determined

and that upon this determination depends the acceptance or

rejection of the Mother Country’s gift? Does he mean to convey that it is possible New Zealand, which has borne such a

gallant part in the War, will rest content under the shadow of

the League of Nations and take no part in preparing to defend
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herself or the Empire? It is impossible to say, but we do think

some more adequate explanation is called for of why it should
be necessary to publicly hint at the refusal of the free gift of aircraft which ought to form an essential part of the Dominions’
contribution to Empire defence. As to the determination of

policy, it again seems to us that it is really about time the constituents of Empire had formulated their policy sufficiently to
be able to say whether or not aerial defence is to form a part of
the programme. 51

Bettington told the New Zealanders that he thought the government

would be ill advised not to accept at least some of the aeroplanes offered,
and that a certain number of these could be used in the periodical

training given to his suggested Reserve force. 52 Facing pressure from
the editorial writers and the British government, in September 1919,

Allen accepted thirty-eight gift aircraft, twenty Avro 504 trainers, nine

de Havilland D.H.9as, nine S.E.5a fighters, and six large flying patrol
boats. 53 The British government accepted the New Zealanders’ request

to limit the number of aircraft in the original offer. Owing to the delay
in its acceptance, only a reduced number of machines arrived in New

Zealand in 1921: twenty Avro 504s, nine D.H.9s, two D.H.4s, and
two Bristol Fighters. 54

The early postwar plans and gift of aircraft to Australia and New

Zealand had no realistic or immediate effect on the defense of the
Dominions in 1919. There was no air threat. The vast distances that the

British faced to move aircraft to the South Pacific were just as daunting
to any potential enemy. Nevertheless, these plans and the gift served a
useful purpose. Defense planners began to examine the use of air power

to defend the eastern empire. The idea of a ready reserve or cadre of

pilots and mechanics in the Dominions would later transform itself into

the Empire Air Training Scheme, which trained tens of thousands of
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pilots and aircrew for service in World War II. Moreover, the plans laid

the foundation for an aviation industry. Finally, the schemes encouraged
the importance of an “imperial” standard for pilot training, aerial tactics, and equipment. The ideas outlined by the early planners remained
constant themes in air defense throughout the interwar years.

